Introduction

On 12 June 2025, Advocate General Emiliou delivered his opinion in case C-731/23 P, Nicoventures Trading Ltd. In his opinion, AG Emiliou addresses one of the most challenging concepts in EU procedural law – the legal standing of non-privileged applicants under Article 263(4) TFEU¹. Specifically, the opinion deals with the notion of the ‘individual concern’ within the meaning of Article 263(4) TFEU, which is interpreted to this day by the CJEU in line with its 1963 Plaumann judgment². The ‘Plaumann case-law’ has been famously marked for its severity³, which in practice excludes the direct access to the CJEU of private applicants wishing to challenge the EU’s legislative acts. Perhaps, the most prominent element of the critique of the Plaumann case-law revolves today around the fact that Plaumann, in many instances, excludes direct litigation in public interest against EU legislation. AG Emiliou’s proposal in Nicoventures addresses those concerns and proposes the possible application of the Plaumann formula, which would give more agency to the civil society, while simultaneously not depart too far from established Plaumann case-law.

This submission debates the notion that the Plaumann formula (even with amendments proposed by AG Emiliou) constitutes the most appropriate textual, historic, systemic, and teleological reading of Article 263(4) TFEU. It suggests that preserving the Plaumann formula could be a daunting undertaking, and more considerations should go into safeguarding, in the process of interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU, the principles of effective judicial control and the rule of law, as well as the core of the EU’s axiology – fundamental rights.

AG Opinion – in support of Palomino

The ‘Nicoventures case’ pending before the Court of Justice is an appeal lodged by inter alia Nicoventures Trading Ltd and other operators that currently manufacture and market tobacco products in the European Union. Appeal concerns the order of the General Court of 20 September 2023 in case C-T‑706/22, in which the GC dismissed as inadmissible the appellant’s action seeking annulment of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2022/2100. Challenged directive established further restrictions for tobacco products, in line with the purpose of the Directive 2014/40/EU (Tobacco Products Directive).

Under Article 263(4) TFEU, any natural or legal person can seek the annulment of an EU act (i) addressed to that person, or of (ii) an act that is of direct and individual concern to them, or of (iii) a regulatory act that is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.

The contested Directive 2022/2100 as a delegated act would normally fall within the category of regulatory acts; however, it provided for implementing measures, so the GC established that it constitutes an act that must be of ‘direct’and ‘individual’ concern to the applicant. Appellants were marketing or were intending to market heated tobacco products with a characterizing flavor; therefore, introduced by the Directive 2022/2100 prohibition on marketing of such products and subjecting those to certain labelling obligations affected their legal situation. Consequently, the GC established that appellants were directly concerned by Directive 2022/2100.

In the view of the GC, however, the appellants were not individually concerned by the contested directive. That is because the activity of manufacturing and/or marketing of heated tobacco products could be carried out, both at the time of issuing the verdict and in the future, by any undertaking wishing to operate in that market. For that reason, the appeal and the opinion of AG Emiliou in the Nicoventures case revolve exclusively around the interpretation of the term ‘individual concern’ mentioned in Article 263 TFUE.

According to the Plaumann formula, applicants ‘individually concerned’ by the contested EU act are: ‘persons affected by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of a situation which differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee of a decision’. In that respect, AG Emiliou clarified that to be considered ‘individually affected’, the applicant needn’t be the only person or entity affected by the measure. Applicant must be, however, ‘from the point of view of the contested provision’ differentiated from all other persons affected by the measure⁴. AG Emiliou explained further that to be ‘individually concerned’, one must belong to the ‘limited class’ of persons affected within the general circle of the persons that fall within the scope ratione personae of the measure. To be considered part of the ‘limited class’ one has to exhibit peculiar characteristics differentiating that person from others⁵. That constitutes, in general terms, what is called by AG Emiliou the ‘closed-group’ test, allowing for the distinction of individually concerned applicants under Article 263(4) TFEU. AG Emiliou explained the ‘closed-group’ test in a casuistic manner. In an applaudable systematization attempt, AG Emiliou organized fragmented and not particularly coherent case-law delivered by the CJEU on the issue of ‘individual concern’. He noted, that according to the Plaumann case-law, applicant is affected by an EU act if that act might have (i) failed to take into account the position of the applicant (in case of acts whose adoption required, under the applicable legislation, to consider the position of some specific group of persons of which the applicant was part);  (ii) infringed a substantive right of the applicant (in case of acts which, unlike for the majority of the persons concerned, had a retrospective impact on acquired rights or ongoing legal relationships of the applicant); (iii) infringed a procedural right of the applicant; and (iv) produced significant adverse effects on a legitimate interest of the applicant (in cases typically concerning the fields of competition law, State aid, merger control and anti-dumping, but also agriculture)⁶.

As AG Emiliou is very mindful of, the Plaumann judgement is ‘one of the most harshly criticized’ Court decisions⁷. He noted in particular two main arguments against Plaumann. One strand of criticism suggests that Plaumann is unclear and difficult to understand, which poses an unnecessary additional obstacle for the non-privileged applicants in accessing courts. The second strand of critique highlights that under the existing Plaumann case-law, individuals and associations are unable, in many instances, to challenge the ‘measures that harm a class of people’. That concern resonates strongly after the Carvahlo judgement⁸ dismissing an environmental claim in the public interest of mitigating climate change⁹.

Critique, furthered in the majority by the academics and civil society, is something the AG Emiliou is aware of; however, he persuades, the Plaumann formula should stay. In his proposition, he attempts to address and mitigate the shortcomings of Plaumann and, at the same time, not abandon the formula as a principle.

AG Emiliou is convinced that Plaumann is the right interpretative choice to make. In his opinion, Plaumann fits the (i) textual, (ii) historical, and (iii) systemic interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU. Plaumann: (i) limits the group of applicants concerned to the persons in situations sufficiently specific, peculiar and distinctive, which fits the common understanding of the word ‘individual’, (ii) is in line with the intention of the treatymakers, who consciously chose not to abandon the notion of ‘individual concern’ in the process of the amendment of Treaties, (iii) maintains the balance of powers in the EU and the role of the domestic courts as the providers of legal protection in EU legal system (Article 19 TEU, Article 13 TEU).

Also, AG Emiliou finds there is no satisfactory alternative test proposed in literature or in CJEU jurisprudence to this day. AG Emiliou dismisses the famous proposal of AG Jacobs advanced in the Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council in which AG Jacobs maintained, that individual concern should be interpreted as following: ‘a person is to be regarded as individually concerned by [an EU] measure where, by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests’¹⁰. According to AG Emiliou, that proposal is not predictable, demands case-by-case assessment, and requires subjective choices made by the CJEU.

However, despite his support for the Plaumann test in general, AG Emiliou recognizes its shortcomings and proposes limited amendments, which will be discussed in the next section.

AG opinion – going against Plaumann

In the process of interpretative appraisal of the Plaumann in the context of 263(4) TFEU, AG Emiliou initially decided not to discuss extensively the teleological reading and parts of the systemic reading that acknowledge the role of values in the EU legal system. That is surprising, especially considering the constitutional architecture of the Treaties introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.

Admittedly, AG Emiliou finally embraces the EU values system, but only to support the claim that Plaumannshould be refined to a limited extent. In that respect, AG Emiliou emphasizes that the respect that the rule of law and fundamental rights is a principle founded in the Treaties (Article 2 TEU). Moreover, the Treaties include a number of principles securing the democratic nature of the Union. Also, currently, the Charter is a binding instrument. Additionally, in light of the EU’s foreseeable accession to the ECHR, Article 6 ECHR demands a proper construction of the EU’s system of legal remedies. Article 2 TEU, Article 19(1) TEU, and Article 47 of the Charter, and in particular principles of the rule of law and effective judicial protection, are also actively invoked in the recent CJEU case-law¹¹. Including cases relating to the procedural rules governing access to the CJEU, especially those concerning: (i) limits of the CJEU’s jurisdiction in the field of common foreign and security policy¹² and (ii) the concept of ‘legal person’ within the meaning of Article 263(4) TFEU¹³.

The AG proposes, therefore, two amendments to the current application of the Plaumann formula to reconcile it with the EU’s axiology.

First, the CJEU should introduce a change to how it delimits the closed-group. AG proposes ‘that the Court of Justice confirms the closed-group test but abandons the requirement that the group of persons in question cannot be enlarged after the adoption of the challenged act’¹⁴.

The second proposal is to ‘treat all persons equally irrespective of all rights’. AG Emiliou argues that as applied today, Plaumann primarily protects economic interests, which could be reasonable in 1963, but isn’t justifiable today, when the EU is founded on the plethora of non-economic objectives like protection of fundamental rights, democracy, etc. There is therefore a need to rebalance the standing criteria, so civil society organizations can be equipped to protect non-economic rights in the public interest. The question is, how to achieve that objective and not abandon Plaumann? AG Emiliou proposes that, in addition to the traditionally applied Plaumann test, the Court should interpret the Plaumann formula as applying to certain associations devoted to protecting the public interest. To consider association ‘individually concerned’, the contested EU measure must: ‘strike at the heart of the association’s activity, affecting an interest which goes above and beyond that of the persons who belong to that association’¹⁵. In an example given by the AG Emiliou, if the EU were to adopt a measure endangering local species, the local association working exclusively towards the protection of that species could be individually affected, but the same measure wouldn’t affect ‘international environmental associations’¹⁶.

In AG’s opinion, his proposal reconciles all methods of interpretation, does not depart from the textual reading of Article 263(4) TFEU, reflects the intention of the treaty-makers, allows maintaining the institutional balance, and mostly follows the trajectory of the Plaumann case-law produced up to date. At the same time, this proposition relaxes the criteria of application of Plaumann enough to allow some groups to have their non-economic (public) interest protected before EU Courts, which makes it possible to align Plaumann with the principles of the rule of law and effective judicial protection.

In the Nicoventures case, in light of the first proposal mentioned above (to refine the closed-group test), AG General argued that the appellants belong to the limited class of applicants. They introduced to the market a novel tobacco product, which rendered them affected by the specific change of law. Undertakings entering the market later on would not be in a comparable situation. Therefore, the situation of the appellants was singular enough to be called ‘individual’. Since. According to AG Emiliou, appellants were both directly and individually concerned by the contested EU measure. Therefore, he proposed to set aside the GC’s judgment and declare the applicants’ action admissible¹⁷.

Critical assessment of the opinion

There are two considerable problems with the opinion that the AG Emiliou delivered in Nicoventures. It (i) could be considered ambiguous and (ii) despite considerable efforts, it is debatable whether it successfully reconciles important methods of interpretation of EU law, which leads to a questionable balancing exercise (considering the EU’s objectives). That being said, the reservation must be made – the AG Emiliou’s intention to address the gap in protection of the public interest in the litigation before the CJEU is a commendable endeavor and constitutes a step in the right direction.

AG Emiliou, when criticizing the unclear and fragmented nature of the Plaumann case-law, notes: ‘[a]dmissibility should ideally be something relatively easy to verify.’¹⁸ It demands a rather close-up reading, however, to see that AG Emiliou wants the Plaumann case-law to change and to determine his two proposals in that respect (refining the closed-group test and respecting the fact that EU acts can affect non-economic rights).

The second proposition – to acknowledge non-economic rights in the process of application of Plaumann is ultimately the response to the continuous efforts of the EU’s civil society to bring public interest to EU courts¹⁹. Perhaps, AG Emiliou’s proposals to change the application of Plaumann could be simplified in that respect. In particular, the following AG’s observation should be treated as a preliminary remark:  Article 263(4) TFEU should encompass all of the applicants, who traditionally qualify under the Plaumann formula, and also associations that aim to protect public interest. However, that should apply only to the associations specifically concerned with a certain issue affected by the EU act.

Arguably, extended argumentation on how the abovementioned proposal would fit within the Plaumann formula wasn’t necessary. The Plaumann formula does not appear in Treaties and is not set in stone. Ultimately, it was an interpretation of today’s Article 263 TFEU delivered by the Court in 1963. Plaumann can be operationalized and in line with all the interpretation methods, in the case of some applicants, even today. However, in some cases, what is needed is a clear interpretation of 263(4) TFEU, concerned predominantly with the issue of access of representatives of civil society to courts. Especially when they strive to protect the objectives enshrined in EU law.

Therefore, if the Court were to follow AG’s reasoning, it should preferably devote more effort to explaining whichassociations in particular should be considered individually affected, under which criteria, and preferably deliver more examples. Why would that be desirable? It seems that in line with the limited proposal of AG Emiliou to refine Plaumann, in most cases, the standing would be granted only to the small associations, with a local scope of activity. It seems reasonable to assume that these associations would be less likely to pursue the litigation before the CJEU, especially if the terms of accessibility remain ambiguous.

These considerations lead to the next point of the critique of the opinion, which touches upon its limited and unbalanced nature.

AG’s Emiliou’s proposal arguably could mean, the smaller the harm to the non-economic objective, the higher the possibility of litigating against that harm. It seems that if the EU measure does not have a detectable local and specific effect, it is impossible to litigate against the measure. Unless, of course, the example given by the AG Emiliou concerning local association didn’t mean that he excluded the possibility that international associations could litigate, if the EU measure would affect a considerable amount of European or even world population (which brings us back to the ambiguity of the opinion)²⁰.

Revisiting the issue of interpretation of 263(4) TFEU, it is debatable whether AG Emiliou’s two proposals to amend the application of Plaumann are the preferable textual, historic, and systemic reading of Article 263 TFEU. The next paragraphs present selected shortcomings of the opinion in that respect.

It is arguable that the textual reading of the term ‘individually concerned’ must in every case lead to the conclusion that it means concerning a limited number of applicants (as AG Emiliou proposed based on the Plaumann case-law). This issue needs further research; however, in both English and Polish, it seems linguistically plausible to say: ‘climate change concerns me individually’ or ‘climate change affects me individually’²¹ and mean that one feels personally affected by the climate change (without meaning that there are no other people affected by it). To maintain the distinction between the terms ‘directly’ and ‘individually’ concerned, the Court could adhere to the alternative test proposed by the AG Jacobs in UPA. This test provides the reading of ‘directly and individually concerned’ in Article 263(4) TFEU, which maintains the justification for using both words in conjunction. In that respect, ‘individually and directly concerned’ in line with AG Jacobs’ proposal ‘individually concerned’ means ‘directly concerned’ to an enhanced extent (the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on their interests). This, arguably, is in line with how the user of the English or Polish language could understand Article 263(4) TFEU.

This interpretation would not only be textually plausible but also historically accurate, if we were to assume the treaty-makers made an informed decision to keep the distinction between these two terms in Article 263 TFEU. However, such a historical reading of the provision is weakened by the fact that there was an initial substantial disagreement on the wording of the current 263 TFEU during the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003²². Furthermore, the Court didn’t seem concerned with historical interpretation recently when it was absorbed with the interpretation of another term mentioned in Article 263(4) TFEU: the ‘legal person’. The CJEU found that the term ‘legal person’ includes, for example, foreign countries (Venezuela v. Council) and national liberation movements (Front Polisario II)²³. This was hardly a reading in line with what the intention of the drafters of the treaties was (most probably, they weren’t preoccupied with the protection of third countries within the system of the EU’s legal remedies)²⁴.

In his systemic reading, AG Emiliou gives precedence to the Treaty provisions that secure institutional balance and the separation of powers between domestic courts and the CJEU. This weighting exercise does not give proper attention to the principles of the rule of law and effective judicial protection and leads to limited proposals, which arguably keep the public interest litigation unjustifiably burdensome²⁵. It is worth investigating whether the objective of keeping the institutional balance and not overloading the CJEU with some form of actio popularis couldn’t be achieved better, with greater attention to the systemic and teleological interpretation, which prioritizes values in the EU system.

The roads not taken

In light of the shortcomings of AG Emiliou’s opinion, alternative propositions merit consideration. Arguably, there could be proposals developed that would more appropriately reconcile textual, historic, systemic, and teleologicalreadings of Article 263(4) TFEU and attribute priority to the rule of law and principle of effective judicial protection.

Putting forward a comprehensive alternative interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU extends beyond the scope of this submission. However, limited suggestions on how to approach the interpretation of this provision can be formulated, drawing in particular on the findings of AG Jacobs in UPA, and the recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Front Polisario II.

Arguably, to litigate economic rights under Article 263 TFEU, the Plaumann test as it stands seems sufficient. It appears, however, to be highly unsatisfactory when considering the non-economic interests.

One possible way to address this gap would be that, in addition to the Plaumann test, the applicant should also be considered ‘individually’ concerned if the EU measure had a substantial adverse effect on their human rights. In that case, Article 263(4) TFEU would have to be read in conjunction with another provision of primary law or binding international law concerning human rights. That should be the case, regardless of the number of eligible applicants (even if the act would affect the human rights of a considerable number of people).

This suggestion seems in line with the Court’s interpretation submitted in Front Polisario II. In this case, the CJEU assumed that the national liberation movement was individually affected by the EU’s trade agreement with Morocco, which expressly mentioned the territory of Western Sahara. CJEU held that, since the contested agreement concerned resources from Western Sahara, the “individual concern” is attributable to the holder of the right of self-determination of the people of Western Sahara – Front Polisario. The CJEU was able to do so because it read Article 263(4) TFEU in light of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations (concerning human right to self-determination) and the principle of effective judicial protection²⁶.

The interpretation proposed above would demand the Court to make a subjective assessment whether a person’s human rights suffered a ‘substantial adverse effect’ in a particular case, but that would reinforce the systemic and teleological reading of Article 263(4) TFEU. First, that way, the inflow of cases could be modulated to secure the institutional balance. Secondly, the CJEU would be able to recognize a substantial adverse effect on rights constituting the core of the EU’s axiology. That would address the major shortcoming of Plaumann concerning its inconsistency with the system of the EU’s values.

It was not the author’s ambition to construe a comprehensive alternative interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU; however, some remarks on how the ‘individual concern’ can be addressed alternatively were in order in light of AG Emiliou’s comment on the limited scope of doctrinal critique²⁷.

An alternative way to approach Article 263(4) TFEU, tentatively marked here, could allow better-equipped representatives of civil society to reach the EU’s judiciary and give agency to the citizens. Citizens, who, it needs to be underlined, sustain their continuous and determined efforts to litigate strategically before the CJEU.

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¹ For the overview of the debate on the issue restrictive access to EU Courts, see in particular M. KRAJEWSKI, Relative Authority of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Review: EU Courts, Boards of Appeal, Ombudsman, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2021, p. 23-35.

² Judgement of the Court of Justice, July 1963, C-25/62, Plaumann v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17. 1.

³ See inter alia: A. ARNULL, Non-Member States and access to the Union courts, „European Law Review”, 2022, 47(2), p. 264-272, A. HINAREJOS, „Judicial Review”, in: R. Schutze, T. Tridimas, Oxford Principles of European Union Law, Volume I: „The European Union Legal Order”, Oxford 2018, p. 887, C. BERNARD, S. PEERS, European Union Law, Oxford 2017, p. 275,  S. PEERS, M. COSTA, Court of Justice of the European Union (General Chamber) Judicial Review of EU Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon; Order of 6 September 2011, Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. Commission & Judgment of 25 October 2011, Case T-262/10 Microban v. Commission, „European Constitutional Law Review”, 8(1), 2012, p. 86,  S. BIERNAT, Dostęp osób prywatnych do sądów unijnych po Traktacie z Lizbony (w świetle pierwszych orzeczeń), „Europejski Przegląd Sądowy”, Issue 1/2014, p. 12, A. ZAWIDZKA, „Locus standi osób fizycznych i prawnych na podstawie art. 230 TWE – czas na zmiany”, in: E. PIONTEK, A. ZAWIDZKA (eds.), Szkice z prawa Unii Europejskiej, Vol. I, “Prawo instytucjonalne”, Kraków 2003, p. 200.

⁴ Ibidem, para 23.

⁵ Ibidem, para 28.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ Ibidem, para 38.

⁸ Judgment of 25 March 2021, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council (C‐565/19 P, ‘Carvalho’, EU:C:2021:252). Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 21 March 2002, Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197

⁹ L. HORNKOHL, The CJEU Dismissed the People’s Climate Case as Inadmissible: The Limit of Plaumann Is Plaumann, “European Law Blog”, April 2021, https://doi.org/10.21428/9885764c.5bb23015.

¹⁰ Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 21 March 2002, Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197

¹¹ On the issue of effective judical protection in context of CJEU’s jurisdiction see e.g. A. ARNULL, The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU law: An Unruly Horse?, „European Law Review” 2011, 36(1), s.

¹² Court of Justice, 19 July 2016, Case C-455/14 P, H v Council and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:569, paras 58, Court of Justice, 28 March 2017, Case C-72/15, Rosneft, ECLI:EU:C:2017:236, paras 72–75, Court of Justice, 10 September 2024, Joined Cases C-29/22 P and C-44/22 P, KS and Others v Council and Others (‘the judgment in KS and KD’), ECLI:EU:C:2024:725, paras 77 and 115–119.

¹³ Court of Justice, 22 June 2021, Case C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council (‘Whether a third State is affected’), ECLI:EU:C:2021:507, paras 48–52.

¹⁴ Opinion of AG Emiliou, C‑731/23 P, Nicoventures Trading Ltd, para. 83.

¹⁵ Ibidem, para 110.

¹⁶ Ibidem, para 109.

¹⁷ Ibidem, para 191.

¹⁸ Ibidem, para 70.

¹⁹ Especially in environmental cases, AG Emiliou cites in particular Caravhalo and Urgenda cases, and not coincidentally, his examples of refined application of Plaumann consider environmental issue. His opinion was clearly inspired by the wealth of literature on the subject litigating environmental rights before EU Courts in environmental issues. See for example L. KRÄMER, The environment before the European Court of Justice, in Voigt, C. (ed.), “International Judicial Practice on the Environment”, Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 25, L. KRÄMER, Access to environmental justice: the double standards of the ECJ, “Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law” , 2017

²⁰ It is rather difficult to assess the application of the opinion given in abstracto.

²¹ ‘Zmiany klimatu oddziaływają na mnie indywidualnie’, ‘zmiany klimatu dotyczą mnie indywidualnie’.

²² European Convention, Praesidium, Articles on the Court of Justice and the High Court, CONV 734/03, pp. 17 to 21.

²³ Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 21 December 2016, Case C-104/16 P, Council v Front Polisario, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973.

²⁴ See K. SZEPELAK, Does the Court of Justice Practice What It Preaches? Upholding the Value of Rule of Law in the Interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU, “European Law Blog”, May. https://doi.org/10.21428/9885764c.2fed5488.

²⁵ It is worth noting, that in the past, CJEU went so far, as to interpret in Les Verts the previous version of Article 263 TFUE contra legem, assuming that an act of the European Parliament can be challenged, when the then equivalent of Article 263 TFEU listed only acts of the Council and the Commission among the acts subject to challenge. A. ARNULL, Judicial Review in the European Union, in: A. Arnull, D. Chalmers, “The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law”, Oxford 2015, p. 400.

²⁶ See further on the issue of standing of Front Polisario II: A. CARROZZINI, Working Its Way Back to International Law? The General Court’s Judgments in Joined Cases T-344/19 and T-356/19 and T-279/19 Front Polisario v Council „European Papers- A Journal on Law and Integration”, 2022, 7(1), p. 31-42, K. SZEPELAK, Taking Locus Standi of International Actors Seriously: Joined Cases C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P (Front Polisario II), VerfBlog, 2024/10/15, https://verfassungsblog.de/locus-standing-in-the-eu/, K. SZEPELAK, Sprawa Front Polisario II przed Sądem (UE) a dostęp pozapaństwowych podmiotów międzynarodowych do sądów Unii Europejskiej., „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny”, 2025, 87(1), p. 139–158.

²⁷ ‘However, only rarely do commentators venture to explain where the Court errs in its interpretation of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and how the requirement of ‘individual concern’ should be interpreted instead.’