The Protection of the financial Interests of the EU and by the EU: leading by Example?

The protection of the Union’s financial interests is a key policy area within the EU legal order¹. However, given the unique model of integration adopted at the Union level, the EU has traditionally relied on national institutions to protect its financial interests. Initially, Union policies therefore focused on strengthening cooperation among the judicial authorities of the Member States and, more recently, on harmonising national legislation in these fields². The establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in 2017 marked a turning point³, as EPPO represents the first model of a European criminal prosecution service, characterised by a decentralised structure led by a small central unit.

The judgment⁴ presented here concerns a case of special interest, since it deals with the protection of the financial interests of the EU at the supranational level, i.e., from the perspective of the functioning of the European institutional and administrative machinery.

The case originated from investigations conducted by EPPO, dealing with suspected irregularities in recruitment proceedings carried out by the ECA⁵. This makes the case both high-profile and sensitive, and crucial to the credibility of the EPPO, first from a supranational perspective and, indirectly, because of its decentralised structure, at the domestic level. From an institutional perspective, this case concerns the principle of loyal cooperation⁶ and, indirectly, affects the credibility and coherence of the EU as a legal order abiding by the rule of law.

With judgment of 10 June 2026, the General Court of the European Union (General Court) upheld an action for annulment brought by the EPPO against ECA, seeking recognition of its investigative powers also when they concern officials of the Union’s institutions. The core issue concerned the justifiability of the denial of cooperation with EPPO on the grounds of the protection of the financial interests of the EU. The Court of Auditors has already appealed the judgment before the Court of Justice⁷.

The Action: the Investigation by EPPO into alleged Recruitment Irregularities at ECA

In July 2022, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) submitted a report to EPPO concerning possible irregularities in the recruitment and appointment of an official at the Court of Auditors. In the same year, EPPO decided to open an investigation, suspecting that an offence falling within its jurisdiction may have been committed, via its European Delegated Prosecutor in Luxembourg⁸.

Nevertheless, investigators soon encountered strong resistance from the ECA, which, according to the EPPO, consistently obstructed access to critical evidence. In the context of its investigation, the European Parquet  asked the Court of Auditors to lift the confidentiality rule of its officials and hear them as witnesses in the framework of the EPPO’s criminal investigation, without success⁹.

A prolonged institutional conflict followed, as the ECA repeatedly¹⁰ refused EPPO requests to lift confidentiality obligations for staff witnesses and denied access to electronic archives. This culminated in EPPO suing the ECA in 2025 for obstructing the investigation, bringing an action for annulment under Article 263 TFUE¹¹.

In its action, EPPO raised five pleas in law: the first one on the misuse of power concerning confidentiality, loyalty, and integrity in the conduct of EU officials¹²; secondly, the EPPO contested the Court of Auditors’ violation of the duty of sincere cooperation provided for in Article 13(2) TEU¹³. With the third plea in law, the EPPO alleged a breach of the obligation to respect the confidentiality of criminal investigations¹⁴. With the fourth plea, the EPPO claimed a violation of its independence in the conduct of criminal investigations¹⁵. With the fifth plea, the EPPO challenged an incorrect application of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities, as ECA did not authorise the hearing of witnesses. In EU law, the hearing of witnesses must be authorised by the institution to which they belong¹⁶. The audit institution, with an act qualified as a ‘statement of position’, did not authorise the hearing of witnesses, refusing to lift the duty of confidentiality. ECA obstructed EPPO’s investigations and challenged its approach, arguing it was contradictory. In a nutshell, the core of the action argues that, by repeatedly refusing to cooperate with the EPPO, ECA breached EU law.

The Judgement: striking a fair Balance between institutional Prerogatives and EPPO’s investigative Powers

With its judgment of 10 June 2026, the General Court upheld the action for annulment against the ‘statement of position’ of the European Auditors. It safeguarded the EPPO’s investigative powers while respecting the principle of institutional balance.

The pleas of inadmissibility raised by the financial watchdog, who argued for the absence of a challengeable act and of a legal interest in bringing proceedings, have been dismissed¹⁷. On this point, we wish to recall here that the Court has since time decided for the admissibility of annulment actions against all measures or provisions, “whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have binding legal effects”¹⁸.

As to the core of the merit, the reasoning of the General Court focused on the interpretation and extent of EPPO’s investigative powers and on their balance with other interests, deciding the case only on the fifth plea: the core point made by the General Court clarified that the notion of interests of the Union, justifying a refusal to lift the confidentiality duty for staff to be heard as witnesses, is to be interpreted narrowly, to avoid encroachment on the investigative powers of the EPPO¹⁹.

The General Court roots the question in a primary treaty provision, stating a basic tenet of the rule of law, i.e., that “each institution is to act within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them”²⁰. The General Court further links these provisions to the principle of institutional balance, which is the European projection of the principles of the état de droit, typical of the civil law tradition, translated in common law systems as ‘checks and balances’²¹. This important principle of EU law is a projection of the legality principle in inter-institutional relations, of which the principle of sincere cooperation is a corollary²².

In this matter, the General Court rejected a point defended by ECA concerning the relation between the decision not to lift the immunity of the staff under investigation and the decision not to lift the confidentiality duty for staff to be heard as witnesses. The General Court recognises that these are discrete legal institutes and their conflation impairs the investigative powers of the EPPO²³.

Having shifted the core of the litigation to the balance between confidentiality, functional to protect the (financial) interests of the EU, and investigative powers, the General Court dissects the point concerning the interpretation of the notion of interests of the Union, which can legitimise a refusal to lift the confidentiality duty. The General Court explained that the refusal cannot be based on the fact that such lifting would amount to a circumvention of the refusal to lift the immunity, because if that line were to be accepted, that “would amount to allowing any institution (…) to assess the characterisation of the facts that are the subject matter of an investigation and to determine the conditions under which the EPPO is authorised to conduct that investigation, which would have the effect of depriving the EPPO of the possibility of fully exercising” its investigative powers²⁴.

The Case and its Legacy: the Importance of leading by Example

As anticipated in my presentation of this case²⁵, this judgement is relevant from various perspectives, both at the supranational level and in a more integrated European perspective. In this short comment, I will reflect upon a couple of aspects.

First, at the supranational level, this case is relevant for the sound development of the European institutional and administrative machinery. European institutions, bodies, and agencies must abide by EU rules and values, as the EU legal order is based on the rule of law, a principle of paramount importance for the whole system. The fight against maladministration is crucial for the implementation of the rule of law in the context of the functioning of the European administrative level. It is therefore important for the EU to be coherent in the message it gives Member States: the protection of the Union’s financial interests must be a clear prerogative at all levels, including the supranational, i.e., for and by EU institutions, offices and agencies. One can lead only by giving the right example. The behaviour of ECA can be framed as ‘obstruction’ or ‘sabotage’ of EPPO’s institutional prerogatives²⁶: a different judgement of the Court would have left little hope for the consolidation of the rule of law and the prosecution function within the European Union.

The importance of leading by example is all the more evident in light of the expansion of conditionality in EU law²⁷. In recent years, the effort to find a remedy to one of the existential crises of the Union²⁸, the rule of law backsliding, has led the legislator to push the boundaries of conditionality and to forge the protection of financial interests as an instrument to react to the rule of law crisis. First, the Conditionality Regulation²⁹ and, second, the Common Provisions Regulation³⁰ have become the main instruments of the new rule of law conditionality, a crucial tool in the implementation and governance of one of the most innovative EU instruments, the Next Generation EU³¹. In this perspective, the protection of the financial interests of the EU is undergoing a constitutional transformation, and the same is happening to the founding values of Article 2 TEU, as witnessed by the ruling Commission v Hungary (Case C-769/22), delivered on April 21, 2026³².

Against the background of all these reforms and novelties, the lack of collaboration with EPPO by the ECA leaves room for reflection. Furthermore, the transformation of instruments such as the protection of the financial interests of the EU requires coherence and a good example at the supranational level: this is crucial to the credibility of the Union, in itself, and furthermore in the perspective of the effort requested by Member States. In this context, the Court of Justice has embraced a clear role in establishing a tie between the rule of law, the budget and the protection of the financial interests of the EU, consolidating this work with the principles of solidarity and mutual trust³³.

The Significance of this Case for the Role of EPPO in the Union: a Message for the Member States?

The facts of this case, as exposed in the action, do reveal a lack of cooperation and respect for the prerogatives of the EPPO³⁴ by the ECA. The ‘sabotage’ carried out by the latter undermined the work of EPPO, which sought redress before the General Court.

The rules of the founding Regulation endow EPPO with independence to carry out its functions³⁵, and provide that it shall act in the interest of the Union as a whole, as defined by EU law, and neither seek nor take instructions from any person external to EPPO³⁶. Furthermore, it shall be bound in all its activities by the principles of the rule of law and proportionality³⁷.

For this purpose, the material competence of the EPPO is identified with respect to criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union and, to this end, the EPPO is endowed with powers to carry out investigations and other measures, and to make requests for the lifting of privileges and immunities under Union law³⁸. It is of paramount importance that EPPO’s prerogatives are respected by other institutions, as indirectly this influences the consolidation of the function and role of EPPO at the domestic level: this is, in my interpretation, one of the core meanings of this case, having regard to the decentralised nature of EPPO. To deepen this perspective, it is known that during the negotiations on the EPPO founding regulation, stakeholders were unable to resolve all matters perceived as sensitive to states’ sovereignty³⁹. One of the most crucial issues is the procedure for defining conflicts of jurisdiction between EPPO and national prosecutors, eventually codified in Article 25(6) of the EPPO Regulation. It is also no coincidence that one of the pending cases concerning EPPO relates to the designation of the national authority competent to rule on conflicts of jurisdiction between EPPO and national authorities by the Croatian constitutional court⁴⁰. If Member States are competent to designate the national authority to rule on those conflicts of jurisdiction, as compromise crystallised in the founding Regulation, it should nevertheless be for the Court of Justice to rule on the interpretation of the Regulation’s provisions on jurisdiction and on the compliance of national provisions with EU law. Indeed, Croatian law endorses the Prosecutor General with this task, and so did other Member States, Italy included. This choice has been explained as a case of compromise leading to a standoff⁴¹. The Court of Justice will be called upon to give a meaningful reply, of vital importance for the consolidation and success of the EPPO, and also for the harmonious interpretation of domestic rules with core provisions of the EU legal order, touching upon judicial independence, uneven access to justice and breach of the rights of defence⁴². What is at stake is the consolidation of the role of the EPPO in the protection of the financial interests of the EU, and its role in the Member States. With this judgment of June 2026, the General Court made clear that EPPO’s prerogatives are (to be) respected by EU institutions.

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¹ Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, OJEU, L 198 of 28 July 2017, pp. 29-41. See A. Damato, La tutela degli interessi finanziari tra competenze dell’Unione e obblighi degli Stati membri, Bari, 2018; G. Pizzolante, La lotta alle frodi finanziarie nel diritto penale europeo, Bari, 2019.

² See Articles 82 and 83 TFEU. See C. Amalfitano, Commento artt. 82 e 83 TFUE, in A. Tizzano (a cura di), Le fonti del diritto italiano – Trattati dell’Unione europea, 2a ed., Milano, 2014, pp. 866-910.

³ Art. 86 TFEU enabled the adoption of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJEU, L 283 of 31 October 2017, pp. 1-71. For comments, see N. Parisi, La Procura europea: un tassello per lo spazio europeo di giustizia penale, Università di Catania – Online Working Paper 2013/n. 48; H. Herrnfeld, D. Brodowski, C. Burchard (eds.), European Public Prosecutor’s Office: Article-by-Article Commentary, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020; K. Ligeti, M. Antunes, F. Giuffrida, The European Public Prosecutor’s Office at launch. Adapting national systems, transforming EU criminal law, Wolters Kluwer, 2020; V. Mitsilegas, European prosecution between cooperation and integration: The European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the rule of law, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2021, vol. 28, n. 2, pp. 245-264; L. Salazar, L’adeguamento interno da parte italiana al regolamento EPPO alla vigilia dell’avvio delle prime indagini, in Sistema Penale, 2021, n. 4, pp. 53-73; J. Öberg, The European Public Prosecutor: Quintessential supranational criminal law?, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2021, pp. 164-181; L. De Matteis, Autonomia e indipendenza della Procura europea come garanzia dello Stato di diritto, in Questione Giustizia, 2021, p. 11 ff.; R. Belfiore, L’esercizio dell’azione penale da parte dell’EPPO tra legalità e margini di discrezionalità, in Cassazione Penale, 2022, n. 10, pp. 3677-3690; A. Venegoni, L’EPPO nel panorama della cooperazione giudiziaria europea, in Cassazione Penale, 2022, nn. 7-8, pp. 2798-2808; B. Minucci, La Procura europea: uno strumento al servizio dell’effettività della cooperazione giudiziaria in materia penale, in Quaderno speciale AISDUE, 2023, p. 295; K. Ligeti, The European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in V. Mitsilegas, M. Bergström, T. Quintel (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024, pp. 462-492.

⁴ General Court, 10 June 2026, Case T-99/25, European Public Prosecutor’s Office v European Court of Auditors.

⁵ See ‘EU court backs prosecutors in clash with Court of Auditors over recruitment probe’ available at the following link https://iclg.com/news/eu-court-backs-prosecutors-in-clash-with-court-of-auditors-over-recruitment-probe/

⁶ M. Siclari, The duty of sincere cooperation to the test of investigations of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office: observations on the judgment EPPO v Court of Au-ditors (T-99/25), forthcoming, in this Journal.

⁷ Registered with case number C-947/26 P.

⁸ See General Court, European Public Prosecutor’s Office v European Court of Auditors, cit., paras 3-4.

⁹ Ibidem, paras 2-12.

¹⁰ Ibidem, paras 2-12.

¹¹ General Court, European Public Prosecutor’s Office v European Court of Auditors, cit.: Action brought on 10 February 2025 – European Public Prosecutor’s Office v Court of Auditors, OJEU, C/2025/2403 of 28 April 2025. See judgment EPPO v. ECA, para. 1.

¹² Article 19 of the Staff Regulation states: “An official may not, without the permission of the appointing authority, publish or cause to be published, whether alone or with others, any matter dealing with the work of the Union or relating to the activities of the Union. Permission shall be refused only where the proposed publication is liable seriously to prejudice the legitimate interests of the Union”.

¹³ This duty of inter-institutional loyalty and sincere cooperation is the expression of the more general principle of sincere cooperation of Article 4(3) TEU. See. F. Casolari, Leale cooperazione tra stati membri e Unione europea, Napoli, 2020. The EPPO contests the reiteration of a series of decisions by the audit institution, denying it the possibility to fulfil its mission under Article 86 TFEU, i.e., to investigate criminal offences affecting the Union budget. The EPPO argues that the denial of the request under Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, and the consequent impossibility for the EPPO to pursue its mission to ‘seek all relevant evidence, whether inculpatory or exculpatory’ amounts to an undue interference with the EPPO’s powers under the Treaties and, therefore, to a violation of the duty of sincere cooperation.

¹⁴ In the view of the EPPO, the ECA breached this provision, by seeking direct or indirect access to information held by the EPPO in the context of the ongoing criminal investigation – in particular by requesting the organization of meetings at technical level with officials not authorised to know about the criminal investigation; in doing so, the ECA exceeded the limits of its mandate and disregarded its obligations under EU law, in particular, the respect for the confidentiality of criminal investigations.

¹⁵ In the interaction between the EPPO and ECA preceding the action before the General Court, EPPO claimed that ECA tried to scrutinise the activities of the EPPO. On its side, EPPO argued that criminal investigations are a purely judicial prerogative, lying exclusively with the EPPO and the competent national authorities, inasmuch as the protection of the Union’s financial interests is concerned. With the procedure directing at lifting the confidentiality rule of ECA officials, the audit institution tried to interfere with the investigations by EPPO, arguing that there was no criminal offence, and substituting its own assessment to that of EPPO.

¹⁶ See General Court, European Public Prosecutor’s Office v European Court of Auditors, cit., para. 62.

¹⁷ Ibidem, paras 16-17; M. Siclari, The duty of sincere cooperation to the test of investigations of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office: observations on the judgment EPPO v Court of Auditors (T-99/25), forthcoming, in this Journal.

¹⁸ See General Court, European Public Prosecutor’s Office v European Court of Auditors, cit., para. 20. The consolidation of the rule of law in the European legal order has implied the justiciability of rights also against ‘soft law’ instruments, as decided in the recent judgment Fédération Bancaire Française. See Court of Justice, 15 July 2021, Case C-911/19, Fédération bancaire française (FBF) v Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), para. 36; this case developed the ESMA (or short selling) case law: see Court of Justice, 22 January 2014, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council re: ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority).

¹⁹ See General Court, European Public Prosecutor’s Office v European Court of Auditors, cit., para. 68.  

²⁰ Art. 13, 2 TEU; see General Court, European Public Prosecutor’s Office v European Court of Auditors, cit., para. 60.

²¹ For the relations between institutional balance, rule of law and checks and balances see E. Carolan, D. Curtin, In Search of a New Model of Checks and Balances for the EU: Beyond Separation of Powers, in J. Mendes and I. Venzke (eds.), Allocating authority: who should do what in European and international law?, Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2018, pp. 53-76. The traditional paradigm of the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judiciary is expression of this core idea, which in the common law systems has found translation into the principle of ‘checks and balances’: in the EU legal order the principle of (inter)institutional equilibrium is the peculiar functional translation of Montesquieu’s separation of powers. Poiares Maduro frames it as a process of low-intensity constitutionalism, because it is characterised by a gradual judicial and political development built upon national constitutional sources and was limited to the control of European and national forms of power, not linked to the creation of a polity. See M. Poiares Maduro, The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2005, pp. 332-356, at 340-342. This process of low intensity constitutionalization has concerned national public powers. First of all, individuals have been entitled to have rights to be invoked against national public powers: it is the Van Gend en Loos rationale which is rooted in the EU legal order. Secondly, also European public bodies have been limited in their room of manoeuvre because the Court of Justice had to defend the character and the quality of the newly established European legal order against the background of the limitations of national sovereignties it was asking to the Member States. It is not a case that in the same year has started its constitutional law narrative, it has decided – in the judgment Johnston of 1986 – that the right to an effective remedy is expression of a general principle of law which is also to be taken into consideration in Community law.  

²² S. Platon, The principle of institutional balance: rise, eclipse and revival of a general principle of EU constitutional law, in K. Ziegler, P. Neuvonen, V. Moreno-Lax (eds.), Research Handbook on General Principles in EU Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022, p. 136-155.

²³ General Court, European Public Prosecutor’s Office v European Court of Auditors, cit., paras 61-68, in particular 68.

²⁴ Ibidem, para. 68.

²⁵ L. Marin, ‘The Importance of Being Earnest?’ The Fight Against Fraud within the Institutions of the Union, in this Journal, 2025.

²⁶ A. Akbik, A. Bobic, C. Freudlsperger, M. Migliorati, When Compromise Becomes Standoff: Joint Implementation and the Case of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in Governance, 2026, p. 39 ff. 

²⁷ For some references, see L. Fromont, What EU Conditionality Says about the Rule of Law, in European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2025, pp. 839-852; A. Sandulli, E. Tatì, A. Nato, Introduction to the Special Section: The Shape-Shifting Definition of the EU’s Financial Interest and its Protection in Contemporary Europe, in European Papers, 2024, pp. 1062-1066; C. Fasone, M. Simoncini, Next Generation EU and Governance by Conditionality: A Transformation of the European Economic Constitution?, in European Papers-A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024, pp. 1148-1179; M. Fisicaro, Beyond the Rule of Law Conditionality: Exploiting the EU Spending Power to Foster the Union’s Values, in European Papers, 2022, pp. 697-719.

²⁸ M. K. Davis Cross, The Politics of Crisis in Europe, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 22-53.

²⁹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, OJEU, L 433I of 22 December 2020, pp. 1-10.

³⁰ Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, OJEU, L 231 of 30 June 2021, pp. 159-706. This act has been reformed. For an overview, see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02021R1060-20260701. For comments, see E. Rubio, T. Kiss-Galfalvi et al., The tools for protecting the EU budget from breaches of the rule of law: the Conditionality Regulation in context, Study, PE 747.469 – April 2023, available at https://institutdelors.eu/content/uploads/2025/04/IPOL_STU2023747469_EN.pdf and EPRS, Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation: European Impementation Assessment, In-Depth Analysis, PE 774.664 – July 2025, at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2025/774664/EPRS_IDA(2025)774664_EN.pdf.

³¹ A. Sandulli, E. Tatì, A. Nato, Introduction to the Special Section: The Shape-Shifting Definition of the EU’s Financial Interest and its Protection in Contemporary Europe, in European Papers-A Journal on Law and Integration, 2025, pp. 1062-1066, and the articles of the special issue.

³² S. Fitzpatrick, Article 2 TEU Mobilised: A New Chapter in Values Enforcement. An Initial Examination of the ECJ’s Verdict in Case C-769/22, Commission v Hungary, in this Journal, 2026, p. 1 ff.

³³ Court of Justice, 16 February 2022, Case C-156/21, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, paras 129 and 147. See F. Croci, Solidarietà tra Stati membri dell’Unione europea e governance economica europea, Torino, 2020; B. Nascimbene, Il rispetto della rule of law e lo strumento finanziario. La “condizionalità”, in Eurojus, 2021, p. 172 ff.; G. Contaldi, Le sentenze della Corte di giustizia sui ricorsi di Polonia e Ungheria e l’emersione del concetto di identità europea, in R. Cisotta, G. Contaldi (eds.), Courts, Values and European Identity, Eurojus, 2022. On the principle of solidarity, see K. Lenaerts, S. Adam, La solidarité, valeur commune aux États membres et principe fédératif de l’Union européenne, in Cahiers de droit européen, 2021, p. 307 ff.; G. Morgese, La solidarietà europea: a che punto siamo?, in EUSTIC Jean Monnet Chair Working Papers, 2023; L. Marin, Solidarity and Crises in the European Union: a constitutional principle in the pandemic and energy crises, Bari, 2024. L. Daniele, P. Simone, C. Venturini, R. Di Marco (a cura di), L’Unione europea e le crisi nel mondo contemporaneo, Milano, 2025.

³⁴ As stated in Article 4 of the EPPO Regulation.

³⁵ L. De Matteis, Autonomia e indipendenza della Procura europea come garanzia dello Stato di diritto, in Questione Giustizia, 2021, p. 11 ff.

³⁶ Article 6 EPPO Regulation, in particular Article 6(1), EPPO Regulation.

³⁷ Article 5 EPPO Regulation.

³⁸ Respectively, Article 22, Article 30 ff, Article 29 EPPO Regulation.

³⁹ A. Akbik, A. Bobic, C. Freudlsperger, M. Migliorati, When Compromise Becomes Standoff: Joint Implementation and the Case of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in Governance, 2026, p. 39 ff.

⁴⁰ Application (OJEU), 02/02/2026, Raukar-Gamulin and Others, C-506/25.

⁴¹ A. Akbik, A. Bobic, C. Freudlsperger, M. Migliorati, When Compromise Becomes Standoff: Joint Implementation and the Case of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, cit., p. 39 ff.

⁴² L. Pressacco, Conflicts of Competence Between the EPPO and National Prosecution Authorities, in D. Brodowski and S. Trautmann (eds.), Strengthening the Future of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, 2026, Nomos, pp. 103-121.