“CILFIT III”? The Remling Judgment and the Duty to state adequate Reasons: the Court clarifies the Nature and Scope of the Statement of Reasons required in order to be relieved of the Obligation to make a Preliminary Reference
Court of Justice, 24 March 2026, Case C-767/23, Remling
“Cilfit III”? La sentenza Remling e l’obbligo di motivazione adeguata: la Corte precisa natura e portata della motivazione necessaria per sottrarsi all’obbligo di rinvio pregiudiziale
“CILFIT III”? L’arrêt Remling et l’obligation de motivation adéquate : la Cour précise la nature et la portée de la motivation requise pour se dispenser de l’obligation de renvoi préjudiciel
This contribution analyses the Remling judgment, which represents a crucial step in the Court of Justice’s case law on the obligation to make a preliminary reference under Article 267(3) TFEU and the exceptions thereto. In particular, it is argued that the judgment under comment may be read as a further development of the “CILFIT strategy”, in so far as the Court proceeds to “harmonise” the types and intensity of reasoning that national courts of last instance must provide when they decide not to make a preliminary reference. In doing so, the judgment contributes to clarifying the concept of an “adequate statement of reasons” in the context of the preliminary ruling mechanism. After examining the Grand Chamber’s line of reasoning in detail, the comment focuses on three problematic aspects of the judgment: the classification of the “irrelevant” question as an exception to the obligation to refer; the apparent extension of the CILFIT exceptions to preliminary questions of validity; and the misalignment between the obligation to refer and the obligation to provide reasons. In conclusion, the contribution argues that Remling affects the delicate balance between trust and control underpinning the preliminary ruling mechanism, tilting that balance towards greater control over the conduct of national courts of last instance.
